Sadat’s Deal with Israel: Regaining Sinai at the Cost of Palestine
Recalling the Camp David Accords of September 17th, 1978: How Egypt got kicked out of Arab League into the arms of Israel; a case study in realism in International Relations.
Anwar Sadat, once celebrated for Egypt’s success in the October War, soon faced declining support as his promises of prosperity went unfulfilled. He believed Egypt’s future hinged on peace with Israel and U.S. support. After the 1973 war, U.S. diplomacy secured partial Israeli withdrawals from the Sinai and reopened the Suez Canal, providing much-needed revenue for Egypt. However, Egypt’s financial struggles persisted, leading Sadat, in desperation, to launch an unsuccessful military campaign against Libya in 1977 to capture its oil fields. This move was widely unpopular in Egypt, the Arab world, and even in Washington, forcing Sadat to withdraw.
After food riots in January 1977, Sadat realized the urgency of finding new sources of revenue for Egypt. He failed to secure funds from wealthy Arab nations and shifted his focus to peace with Israel, which could unlock American aid. Through intermediaries like Morocco’s King Hassan and Romania’s President Nicolae Ceaușescu, Sadat began pursuing reconciliation with Israel. He believed that just as Egypt had demonstrated military leadership in the October War, he could assert Egypt’s dominance over the Arab world by leading a peace deal with Israel.
To pursue this bold move, Sadat reshuffled his political team, bringing in Boutros Boutros Ghali, a professor of political science, as a diplomat. Ghali, a Coptic Christian with ties to a prominent Egyptian Jewish family, would later become Secretary-General of the United Nations. In his famous November 9th speech, Sadat expressed his willingness to work with Israel, declaring, “I am ready to travel to the ends of the earth if this will in any way protect an Egyptian soldier.” Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy and others resigned in protest, but Sadat remained undeterred, despite warnings from Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, who considered such a move treasonous. His advice:
Br. Anwar (Saadat), you are always in Hurry… this will be a treason .. Arabs will not forgive you. — Hafez al-Assad
Despite the hardline stance of Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, Sadat made his historic visit to Israel in November 1977, where he addressed the Knesset and called for peace based on justice for Palestinians and the return of occupied territories. This proved to be a diplomatic coup as the Egyptians and Israelis came to the negotiating table with very different expectations. However, this unprecedented gesture opened the door for negotiations, with Begin offering to return the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt and most of the Golan Heights to Syria in exchange for full normalization of relations.
With U.S. President Jimmy Carter’s mediation, after 13 days of negotiations at Camp David in 1978, a peace agreement was reached. Israel agreed to return the Sinai to Egypt, but Sadat had to compromise on the Palestinian issue. Israel would only allow limited self-rule for Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, refusing to grant independence or return any part of Jerusalem, which had been declared Israel’s “eternal, indivisible capital.”
Arab rulers, unwilling to follow Egypt’s lead, convened a summit in Baghdad in 1978. The oil states pledged $5 billion annually to Egypt for 10 years to deter Sadat from making peace with Israel. They also threatened Egypt with expulsion from the Arab League. But Sadat, determined to follow the path laid down by US and Israel, pressed on.
On March 26, 1979, Egypt, after five wars with Israel, laid down its arms, signing a peace treaty with Israel. Politically, Sadat’s actions reflected a form of realism, similar to the political ideas of Machiavelli and Hans Morgenthau, as he prioritized Egypt’s national interests over Arab unity or the Palestinian cause. His move, however, angered many, leading to his assassination on October 6, 1981.
In a broader sense, the disunity of the Arab world can be traced to poverty, the political ambitions of individual rulers, and limited success in confronting Israel (which was strongly backed by the US). This Pro-Israel diplomacy was later reinforced with agreements like the Abraham Accords under Trump and Kushner. From the Arab perspective, Egypt’s peace deal with Israel was seen as a betrayal of the Palestinian cause, reflecting a Egyptian Self-interested move, which undermined Arab unity.
With peace treaty of 1979, Israel emerged to be the biggest beneficiary with no concessions to Palestinians and return of status quo for Egypt. Without Egypt, Arabs lost all their hopes to prevail over Israel militarily.
Thanks to our writer Ayesha Sana for the story.
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